

# The Hard Life of securing a Particle Accelerator

Antonio Nappi, CERN  
Sebastian Łopieński, CERN



KubeCon



CloudNativeCon

Europe 2024





## **Antonio Nappi, CERN**

- In charge of hosting Java applications at CERN
- Kubernetes engineer
- Previously, Sysadmin, OpenStack and Python consultant



## **Sebastian Łopieński, CERN**

- CERN Single Sign-On service manager
- Previously, 15 years as CERN Deputy Computer Security Officer
- Background: software engineering

# CERN - European Laboratory for Particle Physics



KubeCon



CloudNativeCon

Europe 2024



Accelerating Science



# CERN - European Laboratory for Particle Physics



KubeCon



CloudNativeCon



Europe 2024

**Large Hadron Collider** 27km long, 100m underground



**over 15'000 scientists, 100 nationalities**

**2012: Higgs boson discovered**



**1989: Web invented** by Tim Berners-Lee



## CERN Single Sign-On service

- Service overview
- Using Keycloak
- Integrations and customizations
- Challenges and limitations



## Service hosting on Kubernetes

- Moving from VM-based infrastructure
- Why Kubernetes
- Current hosting architecture
- Performance and experiences
- Next steps



# Why SSO (Single Sign-on)?




KubeCon



CloudNativeCon

Europe 2024



Sign in with a CERN account

Username

Password

[Sign In](#)

[Forgot Password?](#)

Or use another login method

[Two-factor authentication](#)

[Kerberos](#)

By logging in, you agree to comply with the [CERN Computing Rules](#), in particular OCS. CERN implements the measures necessary to ensure compliance.

Sign in with your email or organisation

[Home organisation - eduGAIN](#)

[External email - Guest access](#)

Sign in with a social account

By clicking on the buttons below, you consent to CERN's transfer of your login request to the social provider and to receive your account name, name and e-mail for authenticating you. See more details in our [Privacy Notice](#).

[Google](#) [LinkedIn](#)

[GitHub](#) [Facebook](#)



## Usability (better user experience)

- One set of credentials to access all of organization's computing resources
- A single login per day



## Security:

- A central place for enforcing 2FA and password complexity policies, security monitoring, compromised password detection etc.
- Credentials are not exposed to applications



## Cost / efficiency:

- No need to implement authentication and authorization in each application separately

[Keycloak](#) is an **open-source identity and access management (IAM) solution**

- Provides **single sign-on (SSO)** to organization's applications / resources, with **2FA authentication** (OTP, WebAuthn) and **role-based authorization**
- Allows **user federation** by connecting to LDAP or AD servers (including Kerberos)
- Supports **external Identity Providers (IdP)** and **social logins**
- Uses **standard protocols** such as OAuth 2.0, OpenID Connect (OIDC), and SAML



Keycloak is a [CNCF incubation project](#) since spring 2023

# Why on-prem? Why FOSS? Why Keycloak?



KubeCon



CloudNativeCon

Europe 2024



+



## We operate particle accelerators and experiments

- Full control over configuration, release and patching cycle
- Accessible from our internal control systems network

## We value openness!

- Open-source is compatible with Open Science / Open Access
- No vendor lock-in, not subject to sanctions or export restrictions

## Keycloak fits our needs

- A lot of big [adopters](#) (works at scale)
- A growing usage in academia and research institutes
- Engaged user base, actively developed with frequent releases
- Extensible - can be adapted to our needs


(More at <https://auth.docs.cern.ch/documents/why-keycloak>)

Started in late 2018  
with Keycloak 4



# Keycloak-based SSO service at CERN

**200k users** (including externals)  
**10k clients** (applications)  
**10k logins per hour** during office hours



Sign in with a CERN account

Username

Password

[Sign In](#)

[Forgot Password?](#)

Or use another login method

[Two-factor authentication](#)

[Kerberos](#)

Sign in with your email or organisation

[Home organisation - eduGAIN](#)

[External email - Guest access](#)

Sign in with a social account

By clicking on the buttons below, you consent to CERN's transfer of your login request to the social provider and to receive your account name, name and e-mail for authenticating you. See more details in our [Privacy Notice](#).

[G Google](#) [in LinkedIn](#)


[GitHub](#) [f Facebook](#)

**2FA authentication** (TOTP, WebAuthn)  
**Kerberos authentication**  
**eduGAIN federated identities**  
**Social logins** (Google, Facebook, GitHub, LinkedIn)  
**Guest accounts**

# Integration with CERN Authorization Service

## CERN Authorization Service

- separate from Keycloak-based SSO service, but tightly integrated
- manages identities and accounts, applications and their authorization (roles, levels of assurance etc.), groups (80k)
- provides portals for users, service desk, admins



The decision back in 2018 was to implement this outside of Keycloak. However, **Keycloak provides support for most of the above.**

# Our CERN-specific Keycloak extensions


## CERN Authorization Service integration *(see the previous slide)*

- reads and enforces authorization to applications
- creates identities for external accounts on first login


## CERN theme

- CERN customisations and look & feel for user-facing login pages
- admin console: different header colors per environment:


### Dev



### QA



### Production





## OTP validation endpoint

- confirms whether a given OTP is currently valid for the given user
- used by a custom PAM module to enforce 2FA on SSH access to sensitive machines

## Compromised password detection

- during the login process, SHA1 hash of user's password is checked against a huge list of known compromised passwords (from [HIBP](#) and other security sources)

## CERN CAPTCHA

- used during guest account registration
- replaces the default Google reCAPTCHA (for privacy and availability reasons)

## **Various (minor) inconsistencies, limitations and bugs**, for example:

- editing a Keycloak user blocked in AD/LDAP permanently blocks that user in Keycloak
- logs: no “username” (CODE\_TO\_TOKEN), username in “userId” (REFRESH\_TOKEN) etc.
- admin console provides different features & details, depending on the chosen theme

## **Major version upgrades** occasionally bring (unexpected) breaking changes

- e.g. in Keycloak 20, “*openid*” scope became mandatory in calls to UserInfo endpoint (to make it standard-compliant)

## **Some features stay in *preview forever***, e.g. OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange support

- 2019-2023: [regular questions from users](#)
- January 2024: [plans to move it out of preview](#)

## **UI-managed configuration** → **no versioning, no change detection**

- custom solution: regular Keycloak config backups (sorted JSON exports) pushed to git

## One proxy VM to serve Keycloak instances



- Switch to passive could take up to 15/20 minutes

## Multiple VMs running

- Keycloak and Infinispan sharing same Linux process

## Puppet module

- not officially supported by Keycloak





# Why Kubernetes?



KubeCon



CloudNativeCon

Europe 2024

## Keycloak direction is clear

- Jboss replaced by Quarkus (designed for Kubernetes)
  - brings immutability to containers, faster startup, and more predictability
- Kubernetes operator for deployment

## Portable

- Facilitate BC/DR

## Reproducible and Immutable

- Speeds up operations, reducing team effort

## Easier to maintain and deploy in long term

- Vibrant community supporting Kubernetes
- Small community in Puppet world; one main maintainer for the Puppet module


# New infrastructure

## Git as a source of truth

- Make operations and updates trackable and easy to rollback
- Secrets stored in CERN secret store and dynamically retrieved at deployment time

## Split Keycloak and Infinispan

**Kubernetes Cattle** service model for Keycloak



## Dedicated Infinispan cluster


- Build with Podman + Puppet

## HA HAproxy cluster

- Automatic failover with no downtime

## Monitoring and Logging

- Fluent bit
- Prometheus






## Keycloak 20.0.5

### Testing infrastructure

- VMs (3 nodes)
  - 4CPU
- Kubernetes (3 pods in 2 clusters)
  - 4CPU limits

### Close workload model

- Number of users executing the same scenario multiple times
- 10 minute simulation
- 50 concurrent users



# Split Infinispan and Keycloak



KubeCon



CloudNativeCon

Europe 2024

## Why

- Components can be scaled, tuned and monitored independently
- Simplify operations
- Keycloak almost (sticky sessions) stateless

## How

- Create CM out of XML configuration file
  - Specifying **remote-server**
- No official documentation(for version 20)

```
volumes:  
  - name: cache-ispn  
    configMap:  
      name: cache-ispn  
- volumeMounts:  
  - name: cache-ispn  
    mountPath: /opt/keycloak/conf/cache-ispn.xml  
    subPath: cache-ispn.xml  
additionalOptions:  
  - name: cache-config-file  
    value: "cache-ispn.xml"
```

```
<distributed-cache name="sessions" owners="2">  
  <expiration lifespan="-1"/>  
  <remote-store xmlns="urn:infinispan:config:store:remote:13.0"  
    cache="sessions"  
    fetch-state="false"  
    purge="false"  
    preload="false"  
    segmented="false"  
    shared="true"  
    raw-values="true"  
    marshaller="org.keycloak.cluster.infinispan.KeycloakHotRodMarshallerFactory"  
  </remote-store>  
  <remote-server host="dev-infinispan.cern.ch" port="13335" />  
  <security>  
    <authentication server-name="infinispan">  
      <plain username="username_placeholder" password="password_placeholder"/>  
    </authentication>  
    <encryption>  
      <truststore filename="/etc/keycloak/ceritruststore" password="not_relevant" type="JKS"/>  
    </encryption>  
  </security>  
</remote-store>  
</distributed-cache>
```

# 6 months of Keycloak in K8s: good things



KubeCon



CloudNativeCon

Europe 2024

## Operations

- Faster and easier to test new:
  - feature
  - SPIs
  - Keycloak versions
- Keycloak restarts are almost invisible
  - Don't kill user sessions
- GitOps give us a way to track and revert changes easily

## More reliable

- Following all best practices in the CNCF ecosystem
- Redundant architecture

## Stability and easier long term maintenance

- Keycloak Puppet module maintainer could disappear any time





# 6 months of Keycloak in K8s: less good things

CRD with **unsupported** field

## Infinispan on VMs

- Multi K8s clusters and stateful workloads are not best friends

Is there any alternative cache to Infinispan?!

```
apiVersion: k8s.keycloak.org/v2alpha1
kind: Keycloak
metadata:
  name: example-kc
spec:
  ...
  unsupported:
    podtemplate:
      metadata:
        labels:
          my-label: "keycloak"
```

CRD with **unsupported** field

## Infinispan on VMs

- Multi K8s clusters and stateful workloads are not best friends

Is there any alternative cache to Infinispan?!

# INFINISPAN



# ON MULTI CLUSTERS

## Define internal Keycloak upgrade policy

- Frequent releases to keep up with

05 Mar Keycloak 24.0.1 released

04 Mar Keycloak 24.0.0 released

22 Feb Keycloak 23.0.7 released

## Contribute back to Keycloak

- Slowly starting (<https://auth.docs.cern.ch/documents/our-contributions>)

## Re-assess Keycloak's Authorization Services

- Currently implemented outside of Keycloak

## Prepare BC/DR plan

- Test Multi Site Setup

## Investigate service mesh for Infinispan deployment on Kubernetes



## We are very happy with Keycloak

- great software with a strong community behind



## We are very happy with the move to Kubernetes

- mainstream, supported approach
- much more reliable infrastructure
- easy to test and deploy changes





# Thank you for your attention



**Our slides  
on Sched**



**KubeCon**



**CloudNativeCon**

Europe 2024